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Abstract
The author empirically assesses the effects of institutional and political factors on the need and
willingness of governments to make large ﬁscal adjustments. In contrast to earlier studies, which
consider the role of political economy determinants only during periods of ﬁscal consolidation,
the author expands the ﬁeld of analysis by examining periods when governments should be
making ﬁscal efforts but fail to do so (or do not try), as well as periods when no adjustment is
required. To analyze this greater range of ﬁscal situations, a multinomial logit framework is
applied to a panel of 61 advanced and developing countries, generating a sample size signiﬁcantly
larger than previous work. A key ﬁnding is that the political economy factors favouring the
maintenance of sensible ﬁscal policies are different from those that increase the probability of
achieving an exceptional adjustment. For instance, the results for developing countries indicate
that sound economic institutions help governments avoid dire ﬁscal situations; however, those
countries that actually succeed in making lasting adjustments in the face of a serious need tend to
have weak institutions. There is also some evidence that high levels of transfers and subsidies
diminish the probability of successful adjustment in developing countries, and that legislative
majorities improve the odds. In advanced countries, strong democratic institutions appear to
increase the likelihood of avoiding situations of ﬁscal distress.
JEL classiﬁcation: E62, O17, O19
Bank classiﬁcation: Fiscal policy; Econometric and statistical methods; Development economics;
International topics
Résumé
L’auteur évalue empiriquement l’inﬂuence des facteurs institutionnels et politiques sur la
nécessité d’effectuer d’importants ajustements budgétaires et sur la volonté des gouvernements
d’y procéder. À l’aide d’un logit multinomial appliqué à un panel de 61 pays avancés et en voie de
développement, l’auteur propose un cadre méthodologique qui étend l’éventail des situations où
des facteurs politico-économiques interviennent dans le processus d’ajustement budgétaire. Plus
précisément, il examine le rôle de ces variables, non seulement en période d’ajustement mais
aussi, d’une part, lorsque les gouvernements devraient faire un effort budgétaire mais échouent
(ou ne font même pas de tentative) et, d’autre part, lorsqu’aucun ajustement n’est requis. Résultat
important, les facteurs politico-économiques qui favorisent le maintien de saines politiques
budgétaires et ceux qui augmentent les chances d’opérer un ajustement exceptionnel ne sont pas
les mêmes. À ce titre, l’expérience des pays en voie de développement montre que les institutions
économiques solides permettent aux gouvernements d’éviter les situations budgétaires intenables;
pourtant, c’est dans les pays qui tendent à disposer de faibles institutions que l’on parvient à
réaliser les changements durables qui s’imposent en situation de crise. Par ailleurs, certains
résultats indiquent qu’un haut niveau de transferts et de subventions réduit les chances de succès
des ajustements dans les pays en voie de développement, tandis que l’existence d’une majorité
parlementaire les accroît. Dans les pays avancés, la présence d’institutions démocratiques fortes
semble augmenter la probabilité d’éviter les sérieuses difﬁcultés budgétaires.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E62, O17, O19
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Politique budgétaire; Méthodes économétriques et statistiques;
Économie du développement; Questions internationales 
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1.  Introduction 
Sustained fiscal consolidation is one of the major challenges confronting both advanced 
and developing countries. The situation is perhaps most pressing for emerging-market 
governments, which in aggregate have seen their public debt ratios rise significantly since 
the Asian crisis.
1 Indeed, in an effort to stave off explosive debt increases, many of the 
International Monetary Fund’s major clients  (e.g., Argentina, Turkey,  Brazil)  have 
recently pledged to sustain  exceptionally  high primary surpluses well into the next 
decade. Of course, the need for sustained fiscal consolidation is not limited to developing 
countries. Persistent current account deficits and the  burden of aging populations  are 
pushing many advanced nations to improve their public finances. 
In many of these countries, the main concern  is the political and institutional 
feasibility of sustaining large fiscal adjustments over the longer run. Certainly, political 
economy factors played an important role during the Latin American debt crisis, the last 
period of widespread fiscal  consolidation among developing countries (Cline 1995; 
Lavigne 2006). Moreover, the failure of most IMF fiscal programs to meet their targets 
(IEO 2003) and the significant effect of political ideology on the adjustment strategies of 
many  advanced countries over the past decade (Mulas-Granados  2003)  suggest that 
factors other than standard economic fundamentals continue to play important roles in 
fiscal consolidation.  
From the pioneering research by Roubini and Sachs (1989) to recent applications 
of survival analysis (Gupta et al. 2003, 2004), much empirical work has been done on the 
political economy of fiscal adjustment. Most of these studies have restricted themselves 
to examining relatively  short periods of mild fiscal  improvement.  Despite  generating 
typically small sample sizes, this approach has proven its usefulness, producing a number 
of  valuable  policy implications.  The empirical framework may  need to be expanded, 
however, to better describe the kinds of large and sustained efforts currently facing many 
countries. 
                                                 
1 According to the International Monetary Fund (2003b), public debt for emerging markets as a whole reached over 
70 per cent of GDP in 2002, up from about 60 per cent in the mid-1990s.  
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This paper  empirically assesses  the effects of  a wide range of political and 
institutional factors on the need and willingness of governments to make lasting fiscal 
adjustments. Critically, this paper adopts a novel methodology that expands the range of 
situations when political economy factors come into play. Previous studies focus almost 
exclusively on periods of increasing primary balances, irrespective of the reasons for the 
improvement. They do not consider governments that need to make an adjustment but 
never attempt to do so (or try but fail to produce significant fiscal results); nor do they 
account for periods when no fiscal effort is required. These omissions are not innocuous, 
since political economy factors may  well  be influencing  these various fiscal 
circumstances.  For instance,  just a s  political  pressure  or institutional  constraints  can 
affect the likelihood of successfully implementing a public austerity program, they might 
also be critical in determining whether a country falls into a situation of fiscal distress in 
the first place.  This paper corrects these  shortcomings  by  estimating  how political 
economy conditions differ between three states: (i) when governments successfully make 
large fiscal adjustments, (ii) when they fail to do so in spite of an obvious need, and  
(iii)  when  they  face no  pressing  need to  adjust.  The  new approach tests the  basic 
hypothesis that political and institutional factors play  significant roles in determining 
which of these three fiscal states a country may find itself in at any given time. The three-
state breakdown  is well  suited for multinomial logit analysis, and  allows  for a 
significantly larger panel sample than in previous work. 
From a policy perspective, this  paper addresses two critical issues that have 
received little attention in the literature. First, it examines how political economy factors 
contribute to creating situations of fiscal distress, which are often perceived as being the 
main motivators of consolidation attempts. To the extent that the absence of serious fiscal 
difficulties is attributable to relatively competent financial management, this amounts to 
an analysis of the political and institutional determinants of sound fiscal policy. While 
there is plentiful anecdotal evidence of how political economy dynamics can help or 
hinder sound policies, there has not been much empirical work on this subject. Second, 
this paper proposes a new methodology that allows for an exploration of the political 
economy variables influencing the likelihood of successful fiscal efforts, defined as those 
cases when countries that are faced with a need to adjust actually manage to implement  
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sustained consolidation. Although this aspect is similar in focus to previous studies, it 
goes a step further by testing whether there is a  difference between the factors  that 
support this last type of urgent adjustment and those that foster the ability to avoid the 
need for consolidation in the first place. 
The results of the investigation provide evidence that the political and institutional 
dimensions of large and sustained fiscal adjustments matter, particularly for developing 
countries.  However, the probabilities of achieving an exceptional fiscal effort and 
maintaining good fiscal policy over time (that is, avoiding fiscal crises) are not influenced 
by the same set of political and institutional factors. This finding is best reflected in the 
results for economic institutions (proxied by a measure of the rule of law) in developing 
countries.  Whereas high institutional quality is found to significantly increase the 
probability of avoiding a situation of fiscal distress, nations in fiscal difficulty that 
actually succeed in making large budgetary adjustments tend to have weaker institutions. 
One tentative interpretation of these findings is that, although strong institutions usually 
impose greater rigour on fiscal policy, rigid institutional frameworks can constrain 
government action in times of fiscal duress, impeding adjustment. Other results indicate 
that high levels of transfers and subsidies diminish the probability of successful 
adjustment in developing countries, whereas legislative majorities improve the odds. For 
advanced countries,  strong  democratic institutions are the only  factors  that  show a 
positive and robust effect on the likelihood of avoiding situations of fiscal difficulty.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on the 
political and institutional determinants of fiscal adjustment, and serves to motivate the 
selection of explanatory variables. The empirical methodology is explained in section 3, 
followed by a discussion of the results in section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
2.  The Literature  
There is a large and growing literature on the political economy dimensions of fiscal 
distress and adjustment (see Perotti 1998; Annett 2002; Persson and Tabellini 1999; and 
Pinho 2004 for general surveys). Key among the many factors considered are political 
stability, vested interests, social divisions, and the role of institutions.   
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2.1  Political stability 
Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnson (1981) first put forward the “common pool” argument, 
explaining how government expenditures are positively linked to the number of different 
political groups demanding public allocations. Since each group fully benefits from its 
specific spending program but the burden of taxation is diffused, the cost of public 
expenditures is not fully internalized by the political decision-makers and could lead to 
greater-than-optimal public expenditures.  Velasco (1999) shows how  this type of 
fragmented fiscal policy-making produces a deficit bias. On the other hand, Lane and 
Tornell (1998) argue that competition among groups causes profligacy to decline as the 
number of groups increases.  
Roubini and Sachs (1989) find that an index of political fragmentation correlates 
well with the size of deficits in advanced countries. They claim that, due to short tenures 
and the difficulty of reaching an agreement among different political parties, coalition 
governments are more prone to fiscal indiscipline. Edin and Ohlsson (1991) indicate that 
minority governments, rather than coalitions in general, are  driving these results. 
Baldacci  et al. (2004)  conclude that strong government m ajorities encourage fiscal 
consolidation, and Alesina and Perotti (1995) report evidence that coalition governments 
are less likely to introduce adjustment measures.  Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 
(1991) argue that it is the electoral system that matters, finding that countries with 
proportional electoral systems tend to accumulate more debt. 
Tabellini and Alesina (1990) propose that the link between deficits and political 
instability is not necessarily caused by weak governments. In their model of a highly 
polarized polity with alternating majority governments, the risk of electoral loss leads 
policy-makers to run deficits that will constrain the actions of their successors (here, debt 
is considered to be a strategic variable).
2 This is consistent with Baldacci et al. (2004), 
who find that fiscal consolidation is decidedly less likely to occur during election years.
3 
                                                 
2 Tabellini and Alesina explain how, by borrowing to immediately spend on its preferred type of expenditure, the party 
in power pushes the cost of debt servicing onto the next government, which, in turn, will be obliged to reduce spending 
in its favoured area. This sort of strategic behaviour has also been theoretically associated with external borrowing 
(Ozler and Tabellini 1991).  
3  A large body of literature establishes a link between fiscal policy and the electoral cycle,  whether with voter 
expectations that are myopic (Nordhaus 1975) or rational (Rogoff and Sibert 1988).  
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In sum, the literature  on political stability  suggests that a stable government 
majority with effective control over fiscal decisions is what matters most for 
consolidation. Factors that contribute to this outcome, such as the nature of the electoral 
system or the timing of elections, may also influence the odds of success. These results 
reinforce policy-oriented empirical work  that  stresses  the importance of government 
credibility.
4  
2.2  Vested interests 
Organized interest groups can exert influence on public finances that goes beyond formal 
representation in the political arena ( Persson and Tabellini 1999).  These groups can 
introduce a deficit bias if weak institutions fail to prevent them from excessively 
influencing government expenditures (Lane and Tornell 1998). Moreover, they can be 
expected to oppose aspects of fiscal tightening that impose costs on them, and may delay 
consolidation by engaging in “wars of attrition” with other groups, to avoid bearing a 
disproportionate share of the adjustment burden (Alesina and Drazen 1991). Havrylyshyn 
and Odling-Smee (2000) argue that spending on subsidies and transfers is an indicator of 
rent-seeking vested interests, an assertion supported by several studies (e.g., Alesina and 
Perotti 1995; Gupta et al. 2003).
5 
2.3  Social divisions 
Societal fractures, such as income inequality, demographic  differences,  and ethnic 
conflicts,  could  potentially have a n  effect on fiscal adjustment.  For instance,  Sachs 
(1989) holds that many countries were unable to implement austerity measures during the 
Latin American debt crisis because of downward rigidity in public consumption, caused  
 
                                                 
4 In terms of increasing policy credibility, the composition of adjustment seems to matter most. Alesina and Perrotti 
(1995) show that successful consolidations focus on reducing politically sensitive expenditures, such as spending on 
transfers and government wages. Adjustments that are large (McDermott and Wescott 1996), sustained, and gradual 
(Baldacci et al. 2004) also tend to be successful. Similar results are found in a number of other studies, including Gupta 
et al. (2004) for least developed countries, Gupta  et al. (2003) for emerging markets, and Purfield (2003) for 
transitional economies. Tavares (2004) concludes that, when parties take a fiscal stance running against the interests of 
their core supporters (e.g., left-wing expenditure cuts or right-wing tax increases), the credibility of the effort is 
enhanced. Over-ambitious fiscal targets and a history of failed adjustments are also found to lower the odds of success. 
5 Indeed, the authors indicate that, in transition economies, vested interests go so far as to seek subsidies, tax breaks, 
and directed credits from the authorities at the expense of macroeconomic stability.  
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by inequality-driven populist spending.
6 Berg and Sachs (1988) produce evidence of the 
role of income inequality in explaining debt defaults. Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) 
explain how intergenerational  friction can produce a deficit bias, especially if older 
generations are poor. (Older populations are likely to be a bigger drain on the public 
purse if they have not adequately prepared for their retirement.
7) There appears to be no 
theoretical or empirical consensus with respect to the role of ethnic fractionalization in 
fiscal adjustment. Just as it can be argued that ethnically diverse societies are more likely 
to suffer from political turmoil and disagree on the allocation of public goods, countries 
with a history of multi-ethnic cohabitation may have developed political institutions that 
allow them to constructively handle diversity of opinion, which may be helpful in 
managing fiscal adjustment.  According to an empirical study by Dollar and Svenson 
(2000), high ethnic fragmentation diminishes the chance of successfully implementing 
structural adjustment programs. Annett (2002), however, finds that neither ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization nor older populations (the percentage of the population over 65) have 
statistically significant effects on public balances or adjustment efforts. 
2.4  Institutions  
Fiscal discipline has been  empirically linked to a number of institutional factors, 
including  budgetary centralization,  transparency,  fiscal  rules, and  parliamentary 
procedures (see Pinho 2004 for a review). In a more general sense, institutional quality is 
often proxied in the growth literature by an index of the rule of law, which evaluates the 
system of laws, conventions, and behaviour that support market economies, encourage 
investment, and protect public goods (Rigobon and Rodrik 2004; Rodrik, Subramanian, 
and Trebbi 2002). It seems reasonable to expect that high institutional quality could foster 
a more efficient public sector and minimize corruption, translating into a better use of 
revenues and increased tax collection. It could also ensure that fiscal policy will not fall 
prey to vested interests.  The quality of d emocratic  institutions  might also have a 
                                                 
6 Sachs (1989) explains that, in democracies with very unequal income distributions, enormous political pressure is put 
on governments to redistribute wealth to the poor. It is difficult to tax the wealthy or cut their benefits (Ravallion 2004), 
however, since they usually have disproportionate political clout and extensive influence over the legal system and the 
administration. Governments therefore engage in purely distributional policies that result in overborrowing.  
7 Similarly, older generations could be a source of resistance if they are unlikely to fully reap the future benefits of 
current fiscal efforts; however, this may not hold if people care about the debt burden born by their offspring. Different 
discount rates and wealth levels are important considerations in such issues of intertemporal wealth transfers.  
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significant impact on fiscal consolidation, though  a priori  there is some uncertainty 
regarding its net impact. Just as democracies can elect fiscal reformers, there could be 
instances where open and consultative democratic regimes  fail to form the consensus 
necessary for a prolonged fiscal effort.  Similarly, even though some autocrats are 
spendthrift, the absence of opposition in autocracies may facilitate the implementation of 
emergency fiscal measures. 
Most of the work in this area is empirical. The IMF (2003a) finds public sector 
overborrowing to be negatively correlated with indexes of the rule of law and democratic 
accountability.
8  Satyanath and Subramanian’s (2004) results  suggest  that democratic 
political institutions have a positive causal impact on long-run macroeconomic stability 
and fiscal balances. Abiad and Baig (2005) find that high democratic accountability and 
sound bureaucracies lower market risk and hence the need for adjustment in emerging-
market countries. They also find that excessive constraints on the executive branch tend 
to lower the likelihood of a fiscal effort being implemented. 
This cursory review reveals  the l iterature’s broad scope  and lack of a unified 
framework. This suggests that an examination of political economy factors should adopt 
an explorative empirical methodology, casting a wide net over many different types of 
variables, rather than focusing on a particular theory. 
3.  Methodology 
In general, t he empirical literature  considers only  instances of  attempted  fiscal 
adjustment, with the analysis concentrating on the various factors that characterize 
success from failure.
9 A drawback of this approach is that it excludes the vast majority of 
periods during which no fiscal adjustment is being made, either because there is no need 
to consolidate or the country is unable to make the required effort. A more complete 
examination of the role of political economy  factors in influencing a country’s fiscal 
                                                 
8 Francis (2003) produces similar results for financial instability.  
9 Binomial probit/logit analysis of discrete qualitative dependent variables is often used in the literature to estimate the 
impacts of different explanatory variables on the probability of achieving a successful fiscal adjustment. Samples 
consist of governments that have actually achieved consolidation of a certain size (usually 0.5 to 1.5 per cent of GDP) 
over a typically short period (one to two years). Success is determined according to whether a chosen fiscal variable 
(e.g., the debt-to-GDP ratio or the overall balance) improves significantly after the adjustment period.  
  8 
situation requires the adoption of a new classification scheme.  The  proposed 
methodology can be explained using a diagram of a decision tree (Figure 1).  
  
In this framework, a government starts off either in a situation of serious fiscal 
need or not. If it does face such a need, it must decide whether to attempt a large fiscal 
adjustment; those that try will either succeed or fail. Previous studies limited themselves 
to analyzing those  governments that were  trying to make an adjustment (the circled 
grouping in Figure 1), focusing on the determinants of success or failure. Yet there is a 
selection bias in this approach, because it does not incorporate countries that needed to 
adjust but did not show evidence of attempting to do so. This implies that the results of 
earlier studies may not provide pertinent guidelines for countries that are often in fiscal 
difficulty. Indeed, because governments in fiscal distress frequently fail to improve their 
primary surpluses (this is the standard measure of consolidation in the literature), they are 
not adequately represented in previous samples. 
This paper expands the sample set by introducing the notion of fiscal need, which 
makes it possible to differentiate between three different states: when a country succeeds 
in making a fiscal adjustment in the presence of a large need (type 1 in Figure 1); when a 
country fails to do so (type 0); and when a country faces no fiscal need (type 2). Type 1 
“successful efforts” are similar to those in the literature,
10 but type 0 differs from earlier 
                                                 
10 These efforts are similar, but not identical. In earlier work, presumably rare instances of attempted adjustment in the 
absence of a need are classified as successes or failures instead of instances of good fiscal policy, as is the case in this 
paper. 
Fiscal need  No fiscal  
need 
Tries to make   a fiscal effort  Does   not try 





New   methodology 
Initial position 
Figure 1: New Classification Scheme  
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work by incorporating failed attempts at consolidation. Type 2 instances (that is, periods 
when countries face no need to consolidate, which can be interpreted as governments 
following sound fiscal policies) have previously been  largely  ignored in this field of 
political economy research. 
The concept of fiscal need is critical to these new guidelines. Ideally, an indicator 
of willingness to adjust would be required, whereby all countries that wanted to make a 
fiscal effort would be classified as either having succeeded or failed. But willingness is 
difficult to measure. To get around the problem, it is assumed that any country facing an 
objective need for fiscal adjustment will actually attempt to do so. That is, the presence of 
a fiscal need is taken as a good proxy for a country’s true desire to make a fiscal effort.
11 
For this hypothesis to be reasonable, the fiscal need must be clear and pressing. 
The core of this investigation consists of regressing political economy variables 
on a qualitative dependent variable that indicates in which of the three  fiscal states a 
country  finds itself (successful adjustment, unsuccessful adjustment,  or no need to 
adjust). Each of the categories describes a state rather than a degree of fiscal adjustment. 
This makes the investigation more specific than simply explaining the behaviour of the 
primary balance, which can be affected by a multitude of factors that have little to do 
with fiscal consolidation.
12  
Four steps are required to generate the dependent variable, hereafter referred to as 
fiscal status. The first consists of cyclically adjusting the fiscal variables, which is often 
ignored in the literature.
13 The next two steps involve identifying instances of pressing 
need (fiscal need) as well as  periods of large and sustained fiscal adjustment  (fiscal 
effort). By comparing these two series to determine when needs are matched with efforts, 
fiscal status is determined in the final step. The procedure is detailed in section 3.1. 
                                                 
11 This approach is consistent with Sutherland (1997), who argues that, as a country approaches a critical debt 
threshold, deficits become increasingly contractionary, because agents expect massive consolidation to occur soon. 
Since expectations are key and depressed growth is a political liability, it seems logical to assume that fiscal adjustment 
is more likely to be attempted in times of financial duress. Moreover, as Velasco (1999) notes, consolidation may be 
possible only in times of distress if the fiscal excesses are driven by the “pork-barrel” demands of various interest 
groups. In other words, sometimes it takes a crisis to adjust. 
12 Another drawback of using the primary balance as the dependent variable, as Abiad and Baig (2005) do, is that it 
makes no distinction between periods of fiscal consolidation and those of growing deficits: all periods are considered to 
merely represent different degrees of fiscal effort. 
13 All fiscal data are taken from the World Bank (2002), focusing exclusively on central government accounts. While 
this may somewhat misrepresent the fiscal situation of countries where provinces or states have significant budgetary 
responsibility, no other data source is available for such a diverse sample. All data are on an annual basis.  
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3.1  Generating the dependent variable 
Step 1 : Cyclically adjusting the data. Many  previous studies are based on cyclically 
unadjusted fiscal data.  This is potentially problematic,  since fiscal improvements are 
strongly influenced by cyclical factors (Bulir and Moon 2003). In addition, business cycle 
effects often cause unadjusted fiscal series to fluctuate significantly from one year to the 
next, making it difficult to find instances of prolonged fiscal effort (this may partially 
explain the short periods used in the literature). To account for these effects on public 
expenses and revenues, a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is applied to the fiscal variables 
used in this paper.
14 The resulting filtered values are interpreted as “structural” balances 
that are relatively unaffected by the current business cycle. If a government desires to 
make a large and lasting adjustment, it seems likely that most of the policy changes will 
need to affect the revenue and expenditure components of this core balance. 
Step 2: Identifying f iscal  need.  The next step involves identifying  periods when 
governments face an urgent need to make a large and sustained fiscal adjustment. To 
reflect the idea that a fiscal need should be obvious and pressing, such periods are defined 
as years in which overall deficits are growing unsustainably fast, public debt ratios are 
above a critical threshold, or there is a financial crisis. Three specific triggers (identified 
in 2a, b, and c) are selected to qualify a particular year as one in which an adjustment 
effort is required. 
2a) D eficit need:  A fiscal need occurs  whenever  the cumulative total of central 
government deficits (using filtered values) over the past five years is greater than or equal 
to 20 per cent of  GDP.  The logic is that s ustained deficits will eventually have 
undesirable effects on macroeconomic variables such as interest rates, inflation, and 
exchange rates. At some point, there will be political pressure to reduce the fiscal gap. In 
light of the lack of guidance from the literature regarding the selection of this parameter, 
robustness tests include lowering the threshold to 15 per cent.
15 
                                                 
14 Lambda for the HP filter is set at 400, the accepted standard for annual data. To deal with the end-point problem 
presented by the use of filters, the last two data points from every country series are dropped. The only exception to the 
fiscal filtering rule is interest payments on public debt, since these are not deemed to be overwhelmingly determined by 
the business cycle. The smoothed primary surplus series is calculated by subtracting interest payments from the overall 
filtered deficit.  Because interest rates are not filtered, some “jaggedness” is introduced into the primary surplus 
numbers that is not present in the overall deficit time series. Accordingly, annual changes in the primary surplus of less 
than 0.25 per cent of GDP are ignored. 
15 Higher thresholds (e.g., 30 per cent) tend to reduce the sample of fiscal needs dramatically.  
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2b) Debt level need: A need is also triggered when the gross public debt-to-GDP level 
remains above a certain threshold level for at least five consecutive years. The thresholds 
are those breakpoints estimated by the IMF (2003b) that indicate a change in fiscal 
regime at debt ratios of 50 per cent for developing countries and 80 per cent for advanced 
ones.
16  
2c) Crisis need: Finally, a fiscal need occurs in any year in which a country experiences 
a financial crisis (either banking, currency, or debt). The data on banking and currency 
crisis are taken from Glick and Hutchinson (1999) and the debt crisis dates are from 
Manasse, Roubini, and Schimmelpfennig (2003). 
Step 3: Identifying fiscal efforts. Following the literature, this study uses the primary 
balance (overall government balance minus interest payments) to evaluate adjustment 
attempts.
17 Three criteria (described in 3a, b, and c) identify a successful fiscal effort. 
3a) Size: The change in the cyclically adjusted primary  balance must be greater than  
2.5 per cent of GDP over the period of consolidation. This is significantly higher than the 
thresholds found in the literature, which are usually based on one-year changes of non-
cyclically adjusted fiscal variables. The selected limit, h owever, is comparable to the 
cumulative effect of a low-end yearly threshold (say, 0.5 per cent) sustained for several 
years. Robustness tests include raising the threshold to 5 per cent (this figure is used by 
the IMF 2004 to define large fiscal adjustments). 
3b) Duration: To ensure that the fiscal improvement is more than a simple coincidence, 
the 2.5 per cent of GDP increase in the primary balance must be made and/or sustained 
over a certain period, preferably long enough to cover at least one business cycle.  A 
period of six years is selected.
18 
                                                 
16 The IMF finds that the policy link between the primary balance and the debt-to-GDP ratio disappears when the debt 
ratio surpasses 50 per cent, indicating a loss of fiscal control. On the other hand, the relationship intensifies for 
advanced countries after the 80 per cent threshold is breached, indicating that these countries take high levels of debt 
more seriously.  
17 A drawback to using the primary surplus as the metric of adjustment is that it does not adequately reflect the impact 
of debt restructuring, which influences the overall fiscal balance (through reduced debt servicing costs) but not the 
primary surplus. Even if debt restructuring is occasionally an important means of adjustment, however, it is not 
necessarily a lasting one, unless the primary deficit is reigned in as well. Thus, the primary balance probably remains 
the most pertinent indicator of continued fiscal effort in the majority of cases. 
18 There is a trade-off in selecting this parameter: too short a period will not provide enough time for drawn-out fiscal 
efforts to reveal themselves, while too long a period will not capture relatively compact efforts. The six-year period 
allows for the largest amount of successes of a reasonable duration.  
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3c) Maintained effort: The primary balance must be monotonically increasing over this 
period. This condition is not as harsh as may appear, because steadily rising or dropping 
values are the norm when using filtered variables. However, to ensure that small declines 
in the filtered primary surplus do not disqualify otherwise valid instances of fiscal effort, 
annual primary surplus deteriorations of less than 0.25 per cent of GDP are ignored. 
Although any definition of fiscal needs and efforts will necessarily be somewhat 
arbitrary (the entire literature suffers from this weakness), the selected criteria generally 
describe the type of fiscal distress faced by (and the degree of adjustment required of) 
developing countries with debt sustainability problems.
19 In recognition of the fact that 
not all countries face the same constraints, various combinations of the three types of 
fiscal needs and different levels of fiscal effort are examined in the robustness tests.  
It is worth noting that, contrary to many other studies, “success” in this analysis is 
measured only by the behaviour of a policy variable that is generally under the control of 
the government (the primary surplus), rather than some other factor (the overall deficit, 
the debt, growth, etc.) over which the authorities have only limited influence. 
Step 4: Matching effort with need. Having established the requirements for fiscal needs 
(which are basically backward looking) and efforts (which are forward looking), the two 
notions must be joined to identify the three states of fiscal status, the dependent variable 
in this analysis. To support the hypothesis that the fiscal need is driving the effort, it is 
important that the years of need and effort be very near each other and should ideally 
overlap. The following criteria are applied to determine fiscal status: whenever a country 
has a need that is matched with a fiscal effort either in the same year or the next, that year 
and any subsequent year in the remaining duration of the six-year fiscal effort will be 
termed a success and fiscal status will be attributed a value of 1. Any country-year where 
there is a fiscal need that is not met with a fiscal effort in that same year or the next is 
considered a failed effort and fiscal status is given a value of 0. Years in which there is 
                                                 
19 For instance, throughout the 1980s, most of the debt crisis countries in Latin America would have qualified as 
instances of fiscal need. Moreover, according to their IMF programs, the IMF’s three largest debtors (Brazil, Turkey, 
and Argentina) have promised to achieve significant primary surplus adjustments (increases of 1–4 per cent of GDP,  
on top of already sizable levels of public savings) over a short period of two to three years and maintain this degree  
of effort for a protracted period (well over six years). The size of these efforts is not unprecedented: the IMF records  
at least 260 episodes of attempted fiscal consolidation in excess of 5 per cent of GDP over the past three decades  
(IMF 2004).  
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no fiscal need  are  assumed to be  years where the country is  following  good fiscal 
policies. Fiscal status in these instances takes a value of 2, regardless of the presence of a 
fiscal effort.
20 Table 1 summarizes the classification scheme. 
 
Table 1: Determining the Dependent Variable (fiscal status) 
Fiscal need  Fiscal effort  Fiscal status 
Yes  Yes  Success (1) 
Yes  No  Failure (0) 
No  Yes  No need (2) 
No  No  No need (2) 
 
 
One exception is made to these guidelines: any country-year in which the filtered 
overall fiscal balance is greater than -2 per cent of GDP yields a fiscal status of 2. It is 
deemed that the urgency of making an adjustment is much reduced above this threshold, 
such that it can no longer be assumed that a fiscal need is a good proxy for  a 
government’s willingness to put a fiscal effort into effect. Gupta et al. (2003) find that the 
impetus for maintaining a fiscal adjustment seems to fade when deficits improve beyond 
this -2 per cent threshold. Annett (2002) uses a similar breakpoint.  
It is important to note two weaknesses of this screening mechanism that extend 
beyond parameter selection.  First,  since the methodology does not measure the true 
willingness of a government to make a fiscal effort, it may under-represent attempts at 
fiscal consolidation. Indeed, fiscal efforts that are embarked upon without the presence of 
a current fiscal need are not counted as such (they are given a value of 2).
21 Second, a 
causal relationship  is assumed  between needs and efforts when they occur in close 
temporal proximity; in this respect, the methodology probably over-represents successful 
                                                 
20 It would have been possible to further divide type 2 results according to whether the countries made (type 3) or did 
not make (type 4) a fiscal effort, even though they had no need to. T hese categories, however, would not have 
contained a sufficient number of data points for statistical analysis. Moreover, the analytical value of such a further 
differentiation is not clear.  
21  For instance, intergenerational concerns  or hidden “fiscal skeletons”  may motivate some governments to take 
corrective action before a serious fiscal need develops: these types of good governance efforts would merely count as 
type 2s (good fiscal policy) rather than true fiscal efforts (type 1).  
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fiscal efforts. In spite of these drawbacks, however, it is not clear that there is a better 
alternative to this overall approach. 
The generation of the fiscal status variable taking on discrete values of either 0, 1, 
or 2 is perhaps best understood using a graphical example for Canada. Figure 2 shows 
how the Canadian government’s fiscal time series translates into both filtered and discrete 
values. (Note that the vertical axis in Figure 2 has a double function, representing fiscal 
status (0, 1, 2) as well as the primary surplus and the overall deficit as a portion of GDP.) 



























From 1974 to 1981, Canada’s cumulative deficit never surpassed the 20 per cent 
threshold (giving it a  fiscal status of 2).  In 1982, however, the  five-year  cumulative 
deficit exceeded the 20 per cent of GDP threshold and continued to do so for the next  
13 years.  While the primary surplus was generally on the rise, it did not respond 
sufficiently to qualify as a successful fiscal effort, generating a “failure” score of 0 from 
1982 to 1992. It was only as of 1993 that a successful fiscal effort became evident in the 
data, yielding a  fiscal status  score of 1 from 1993 to 1996.  In 1997, the cyclically 
                                                 
22 In this case, a fiscal need is triggered by a five-year cumulative deficit equal to or greater than 20 per cent of GDP. A 
fiscal effort is achieved if the cyclically adjusted primary surplus rises by at least 2.5 per cent of GDP over the course 
of six years, never dropping on an annual basis for the entire period.   
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adjusted deficit finally fell below the 2 per cent of GDP threshold, at which stage the 
dependent variable is given a value of 2.
23  
An identical exercise is carried out for a wide range of developing and advanced 
countries, producing a fiscal status variable with 727 data points. Table 2 shows the fiscal 
status of all the countries in the sample from 1987 to 2000. Episodes of successful fiscal 
efforts appear to be relatively rare, which is to be expected, given the exceptional nature 
of such large and lasting adjustments. The ratio of successful fiscal efforts to total needs 
is about 30 per cent for both advanced and developing countries, suggesting that the 
propensity to adjust is not dependent on the level of development.
24 There also appear to 
be many instances of fiscal needs (types 0 and 1); in fact, they make up about half of all 
the years in the sample (this is true of both advanced- and developing-country subsets). 
This could be partially a result of the limited time period, although stretching the sample 
back to the 1970s would more than likely generate an even greater portion of needs, since 
it would include the era of the Latin American  debt crisis. In the end, it may  not be 
surprising that countries often go through prolonged periods of fiscal need without being 
able to effectively implement remedial measures. Indeed, one of the principal reasons for 
these delays may be political economy factors. 
3.2  Selecting the explanatory variables 
Having defined the dependent variable, the next step in the methodology involves 
selecting appropriate explanatory factors. The ten chosen political economy variables are 
taken from the literature and can be roughly divided into three groups. The first reflects 
political stability factors and includes the percentage of the legislature controlled by the 
government  (margin of  majority);  dummy  variables  for executive election years 
(elections) and for first-past-the-post electoral systems ( plurality—this is the main 
alternative to proportional systems); and an index assessing a government’s ability to stay 
in office (government stability). The second group considers salient aspects of a country’s 
socioeconomic  structure  that could lead to distributional conflicts, including the 
                                                 
23 For a thorough analysis of Canadian debt dynamics and fiscal policy options during the adjustment period, see 
Macklem, Rose, and Tetlow (1995). 
24  This ratio does not, however, imply that the majority of fiscal needs were not eventually dealt with by the 
governments, but merely that their responses did not qualify as large and sustained fiscal adjustments. For instance, 
several short, disconnected periods of adjustment would not qualify as a fiscal effort, though they could, nonetheless, 
be sufficient to correct the fiscal imbalances.  
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distribution of income ( inequality),  rent-seeking  vested interests ( subsidies and 
transfers), ethnolinguistic fractionalization (in 1985), and the portion of the population 
over 65. In the third group, indexes of the rule of law  and democratic accountability 
represent the quality of economic and political institutions, respectively. The first index is 
intended as a measure of economic governance, embodied by the sum of the institutions 
that manage public resources and provide a framework for the organization of private 
activity.
25 The second index gauges the responsiveness of a government to its people. 
High values are attributed to strong democracies, and very low scores to autocracies. This 
index includes a variety of institutional factors, such as the quality of elections,  the 
freedom of political debate, the system of checks and balances, and the protection of 
personal liberties. Table 5 provides a more detailed description of all political economy 
variables used in the regressions and their sources.  
Three of the  explanatory  indexes (rule of law,  democratic accountability,  and 
government stability) are  produced by the PRS Group (2002) in their  International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
26 These scores are holistic measures of political economy 
conditions based on the evaluations of country specialists. They have the advantage of 
generating  a “bottom-line” evaluation  of well-defined  political economy  criteria  that 
would be difficult for non-experts to obtain. Moreover, unlike more specific institutional 
variables (such as, for instance, the degree of budgetary transparency), they are available 
for a large number of countries over a fairly long time period. A disadvantage of these 
indexes is that they are subjective, which raises issues regarding the consistency of the 
ratings between each other and across time.
27 Another difficulty is that these variables are 
not necessarily independent of fiscal efforts. Though the causal link runs primarily from 
                                                 
25 The literature typically captures the quality of economic institutions through two variables: measures of law and 
order and investor protection. This study simply takes a weighted average of these two types of scores to generate the 
rule of law series. The estimation results are qualitatively similar when using either of these scores instead of the rule of 
law. 
26 The ICRG database has wide country coverage and a high degree of index specificity. The database goes back to 
1984, which probably makes it the largest of its kind available. It should be noted that Glaeser et al. (2004) do not 
consider ICRG rankings to be good indicators of institutions, since they appear to be both variable and mean reverting. 
Institutional quality, h owever, especially with respect to  policy  implementation, may change over time and differ 
greatly across countries ( Aron 2000).  Even mean reversion, if this is indeed a characteristic of the data, is not 
necessarily problematic (institutional quality could be stationary over a given time period). 
27 On the other hand, more “objective” measures, such as statistics derived from official sources, have the drawback of 
not always representing consistent political economy factors.  For instance, a minority government may indicate 
political instability in a country accustomed to electing majority governments, but not in another where there is a 
tradition of coalition arrangements.  
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political economy factors to fiscal policy, it may be that consolidation  attempts also 
influence political and institutional variables.  To address this endogeneity  issue, the 
average value of the past three years (not counting the current year) is used to measure 
the rule of law, democratic accountability, government stability, inequality, and subsidies 
and transfers. These transformed variables should be predetermined with respect to the 
country’s fiscal status so long as the ICRG analysts determining the three index scores 
are not basing them excessively on a correctly evaluated future fiscal situation. 
Control variables are included in the estimation to account for all the economic 
fundamentals potentially affecting a country’s need and willingness to make a fiscal 
effort. The same set of control variables is used in all the regressions: country openness 
(trade/GDP), government revenues (filtered), local and global real growth, inflation (an 
indicator of macro-stability and seignorage revenues), and the type of exchange rate 
regime.
28 For developing countries, the existence of an IMF program is also indicated 
with a dummy variable, as is the status of being a least-developed country.
  All these 
variables are briefly described in Table 5.
 29  
3.3  Descriptive statistics 
Before beginning the econometric analysis or discussing causal relationships, it is useful 
to review the data. Tables 3 and 4 compare the means and standard errors of the different 
explanatory variables according to their fiscal status. The descriptive statistics are, on  
the whole, reflective of the multinomial logit regression results reported in section 4.  
                                                 
28 Openness: the more open an economy, the more the outside world acts as a fiscal anchor for the government. To the 
extent that reckless policies will destabilize external balances in highly open countries, openness encourages fiscal 
rigour. In addition, vested interests tend to thrive in closed economies.  Government revenues: higher levels of 
government revenues are a sign of efficient tax collection as well as greater fiscal manoeuvring room (the larger the 
revenue base, the easier it is to orchestrate a given level of fiscal adjustment). Gupta et al. (2003) find that higher total 
government revenues increase the odds of completing a fiscal effort in developing countries. Growth: Although the 
fiscal data used in this investigation are cyclically adjusted, growth may have indirect effects on prospects for fiscal 
consolidation (e.g., it may be easier to bear the political cost of adjustment when growth is strong; see Annett 2002). 
Exchange rate regime: theoretically, the expected sign of this variable is not clear a priori. Fixed regimes, however, 
tend to be at the origin of many financial crises, and instances of successful fiscal adjustment are often preceded by 
significant depreciations. Although data limitations precluded the use of financial market control variables for such a 
wide variety of countries, future work should strive to integrate them. 
29 Several variables in the literature are not included in the regression for theoretical and technical reasons. Because the 
criteria for fiscal need are based on deficits, debt levels, and crises, these factors cannot be included among the 
explanatory variables. Similarly, variables such as the size and duration of the adjustments are also predetermined 
criteria for identifying fiscal efforts. On a more technical level, policy factors such as the composition of the adjustment 
(taxes versus expenditures) are not applicable, given that most of the countries in the sample are not, in any given year, 
actually making a fiscal adjustment.  
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One  salient  aspect of the data  is  the  considerable difference in the  average 
political economy values of advanced and developing countries. Not surprisingly, the 
ICRG indexes are significantly higher among advanced countries for all three types of 
fiscal status. Because the high correlation between these indexes and the level of country 
income tends to  produce multicollinearity problems ( see  Francis 2003), separate 
regressions are run for advanced and developing country samples. 
Within developing countries,  it is notable that  governments  that successfully 
make a fiscal effort  (type 1)  have, on average,  lower  mean  scores for  rule of law, 
democratic accountability, and government stability than the other two groups. They also 
have a higher prevalence of majority governments and  first-past-the-post electoral 
systems, as well as younger populations, greater income inequality, and fewer subsidies 
and transfers.  This paints a picture of  governments  with relatively  larger degrees of 
executive power, lighter social expenditure burdens, and fewer institutional checks and 
balances  compared  with  their peers.  These  characteristics may  facilitate the 
implementation of tough fiscal measures that would otherwise encounter  greater 
resistance in countries with more constraining economic and political institutions.  
At the other end of the spectrum, developing countries that avoid situations of 
fiscal distress (type 2) appear to have better economic institutions and greater government 
stability than the other groups. In addition, they also tend to be more multi-ethnic, have a 
higher degree of subsidies and transfers, and are less likely to have majority 
governments.  Interestingly, m any of these qualities are similar to those of typical 
advanced nations. Countries unable to make a needed fiscal effort (type 0) tend to be 
more  democratic and have proportional electoral systems.  They also have  rather low 
levels of inequality and older populations, two possible sources  of high government 
expenditures. This profile  potentially highlights the difficulties of cutting large social 
expenditures in a democratic environment.  
For advanced countries, the discrepancies are much less pronounced. The most 
well-defined group is that of fiscally responsible governments (type 2), which have the 
highest  mean  scores for  the  rule of law,  democratic accountability, and  government 
stability. On average, they also have more subsidies and transfers and a higher incidence  
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of  first-past-the-post electoral systems, though, like their developing-country 
counterparts, they have slightly  fewer instances of majority governments. In addition, 
executive election years occur more often in countries that run sound fiscal policies (it 
may be in the interest of the government to call an election when the fiscal situation is 
under control). Advanced countries that fail to make fiscal efforts (type 0) are typically 
less democratically accountable, less stable, and have weaker economic institutions. On 
average, they also have a lower degree of subsidies and transfers, less inequality, are not 
particularly  multi-ethnic, and have slightly older populations.  Not surprisingly, these 
countries in fiscal difficulty tend to call elections less often.  Type 1  countries  have 
attributes that lie somewhere in-between the averages of the other two types. They have 
no  particularly  distinct characteristics, aside from  slightly younger populations and a 
tendency not to have first-past-the-post electoral systems. 
3.4  Estimation framework 
The  determinants of the  three discrete outcomes of  fiscal status  potentially  lend 
themselves to estimation using a standard unordered multinomial logit model. As with 
binomial logit models, in a multinomial set-up the probability of one outcome occurring 
versus another in the dependent variable ( Y)  is a non-linear function of  explanatory 
variables (X). In multinomial models, however, a base-case outcome must be selected 
against which the other outcomes can be compared (in the 0/1 binomial case, this choice 
is automatically the 0 outcome); analytically, the choice of base is irrelevant. The fiscal 
status of 0 (failure to make an effort) is chosen as the base case in this study. This is 
equivalent to setting ß0 equal to 0 in the cumulative logistic distribution function: 
Pr(Y=0) = 
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where ß0, ß1, and ß2
 represent the coefficients for fiscal status 0, 1, and 2, respectively. 
The relative probabilities of outcomes 1 and 2 compared with the base case, 0, are:
  
Pr(Y=1) / Pr(Y=0) = e
Xß1  and  Pr(Y=2)  /  Pr(Y=0) =
   e
Xß2.
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ß1
 measures the marginal effect of a change in the independent variable X (for 
instance, some political economy variable) on the probability of being in fiscal status 1 
(that is, making a successful effort) relative to the probability of being in fiscal status 0 
(that is, failing to make a fiscal effort). Similarly, ß2
 measures the marginal effect of a 
change in X on the probability of being in fiscal status 2 (that is, not being in a situation 
of need) relative to the probability of being a type 0. Direct comparisons between types 1 
and 2 can be made by simply taking the ratio of their estimated coefficients; that is,  
Pr(Y=1) / Pr(Y=2) = e
Xß1 /e
Xß2. 
Two regressions are run simultaneously: one of each of e
Xß1 and e
Xß2. Thus, two 
coefficients are generated for each explanatory variable: one to represent the variable’s 
effect on the probability of being a type 1 with respect to the probability of being a type 
0, and another for the 2/0 comparison. The  joint regressions allow for a significantly 
higher sample size than the alternative of running binomial logit regressions individually 
for each of the 1/0 and 2/0 odds.  
  For the multinomial logit approach to be valid, it is necessary that the probability 
of achieving one particular outcome versus another (say, being a type 1 versus a type 0) 
be independent of the existence of other alternatives (in this case, the option of being a 
type 2). Formally, this  condition  is referred to as the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) (see McFadden 1984).
30 The seemingly unrelated regression estimation 
(SURE) technique, which is a generalization of the Hausman test for  cross-model 
hypotheses, is used to test whether the IIA condition is verified. The chi-squared test 
results based on the final specifications failed to reject the null hypothesis that IIA holds 
for either advanced or developing countries, indicating that the multinomial approach is 
appropriate.
31 
The regression model is as follows: 
Yit = c + aXit + dZit + uit, 
                                                 
30 McFadden explains the IIA condition succinctly: “The usual implication is to note that if two choices exist, say car 
and bus in a transportation choice application, then the addition of a third choice, subway, will not change the ratio of 
probabilities of the initial two choices.”  
31 The test involves estimating a couple of bivariate logit models and then comparing the estimated coefficients with 
those of the full multinomial model. Under the null hypothesis that IIA holds, the estimated coefficients should be 
similar.  
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where Y is the fiscal status dependent variable in country i at year t; X is a vector of 
political economy explanatory variables; Z is a set of economic control variables; a and d 
are the coefficient associated with the ratio of probabilities (the equivalent of ß in the 
above discussion); c is a constant, reflecting the pooled nature of the regression;
32 and u 
is the error term. To account for the heterogeneous nature of the  countries involved, 
robust standard errors are used by adjusting for country-level clustering in the error term.  
The regression results for  developing and  advanced countries are reported in 
Tables 6 and 7, respectively.  There are a  couple of challenges to d etermining the 
appropriate econometric specification. First and foremost, the explorative nature of the 
investigation precludes  focusing  the specification on one or two  political economy 
variables ex ante. Second, the particular structure of the multinomial technique, which 
produces two regression outputs, makes it difficult to follow established specification 
procedures.  A purely empirical approach  is adopted to deal with these difficulties. 
Following the logic that any pertinent variable should at least show some econometric 
significance on its own, each of the political economy variables is first regressed 
individually (along with the unreported control variables) on the dependent variable fiscal 
status (columns 2–10 in Table 6, and 2–11 in Table 7). Those variables with coefficients 
statistically different from zero at the 80 per cent level of confidence are then included in 
a subsequent regression (column 12 in Table 6 and column 11 in Table 7). Any non-
significant variables are dropped from the final specifications, which are reported in the 
last column of each table.
33 The results are reported in terms of marginal effects.
34 
Tables 8 and 9 show the results of robustness tests. The robustness of the final 
specifications to changes in the definitions of fiscal need and effort is tested in various 
regressions, coupling small (2.5 per cent of GDP) and large (5 per cent) fiscal 
adjustments with  different  combinations of  fiscal  need indicators,  including  a large 
                                                 
32 While fixed effects would perhaps have been preferable, the relative scarcity of type 1 data points does not provide 
enough degrees of freedom for the inclusion of a constant for each country. But, even abstracting from this technicality, 
the reliance of the maximum-likelihood technique on large-sample asymptotic normality puts a high premium on 
degrees of freedom in a still relatively small data set. 
33 The final specifications consist solely of those variables that were significant at the 10 per cent level in the individual 
regressions. 
34 Because of the holistic nature of the political economy variables and the difficulty in interpreting changes in the 
indexes, the analysis of the results focuses on the sign and significance of the estimated parameters, rather than on the 
size of the coefficients per se.  
  22 
cumulative deficit trigger (20 per cent of GDP), a smaller one (15 per cent), and the 
presence of a financial crisis. The robustness of the results to the removal of the 2 per 
cent deficit threshold is also examined.  
4.  Estimation Results 
4.1  Overview 
The results provide evidence that the political economy dimensions of large and sustained 
fiscal adjustments matter, particularly for developing countries. That said, the factors 
found to increase the probability of achieving a successful adjustment effort are not the 
same as those favouring the maintenance of sound fiscal policies.  In developing 
countries, successful fiscal consolidation is found to be associated with strong majority 
governments, low levels of subsidies and transfers, and relatively  weak economic 
institutions.  However, the probability of developing countries following sound fiscal 
policies (that is, not being in a situation of  fiscal need)  is positively associated with 
higher institutional quality, as well as greater inequality. For advanced countries, political 
economy factors do not appear to play significant roles in fiscal adjustment, but increased 
democratic accountability improves the odds of running sound fiscal policies. 
The results confirm this paper’s basic hypothesis that political economy factors 
significantly affect the need  and willingness of governments to implement large and 
sustained fiscal adjustments.  Indeed, t he inclusion of a  relatively small number of 
political economy variables  considerably  improves  the overall  fit of the models.  As  
Table 10 shows, the pseudo-R
2 indicator for developing countries rises from 0.07 using 
only the control variables to 0.25 in the final specification; for advanced countries, it 
increases from 0.13 to 0.20.
35 This suggests that political economy factors play a greater 
role in the fiscal adjustments of developing countries, perhaps as much as economic 
                                                 
35 The pseudo-R
2 (a log-likelihood measure) for qualitative variable models cannot be interpreted as the equivalent of 
R
2 in linear models (Greene 1997). Nonetheless, it is a commonly used measure of overall fit. Another indicator of 
overall fit is the number of times that predicted fiscal states correspond to actual outcomes. The model attributes the 
highest probability to the actual outcome (i.e., type 0, 1, or 2) in 62 per cent of cases for developing countries and  
53 per cent for advanced countries. Since no fiscal status outcome ever consists of more than 50 per cent of the total 
sample for either country group, the model appears to outperform a random draw. 
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fundamentals. The results for the control variables, shown in Table 10, are  generally 
consistent with expectations and fairly robust to specification changes.
36 
4.2  Developing countries 
This paper’s most interesting finding is that the political economy characteristics that 
help developing countries  to make  large and sustained fiscal  adjustments are not 
necessarily those that help them  to  avoid situations of fiscal need.  The results for 
institutional variables are particularly salient. More precisely, a high rule-of-law score is 
found to have a positive effect on the probability of a country running a sound fiscal 
policy (i.e., being a type 2), but a negative influence on the chances of it succeeding at a 
fiscal effort (that is, being a type 1). This result is very robust, withstanding specification 
changes and all modifications to the definition of fiscal needs (Table 8).  
The positive effect of the rule of law on the probability of avoiding a situation of 
fiscal need (i.e., being a type 2) is  broadly consistent with the literature. There are a 
number of potential explanations for this result. For instance, if the rule of law is a good 
proxy for the quality of economic institutions, then a high score in this index may reflect 
an  efficient public  sector.  This suggests an effective use of government resources, 
sounder microeconomic policies, and less susceptibility to corruption and abuse, all of 
which  help control  government expenses.  Strong institutions  may also  foster higher 
revenues for a given tax system, since agents trust that taxes will be collected fairly and 
used wisely, and evasion punished. Perhaps most importantly, a strong rule of law may 
help diminish the power of rent-seeking vested interests that have a stake in impeding 
fiscal adjustment.  
Interpreting the negative effect of the rule of law on the likelihood of a successful 
fiscal effort (type 1) is less straightforward. One, admittedly tentative, explanation is that 
weak institutional frameworks could provide authorities with more latitude to adopt the  
 
                                                 
36For developing countries, successful fiscal efforts (type 1 country instances) are associated with flexible exchange 
rates, strong world growth, and higher levels of government revenues.  Strong growth appears to favour fiscal 
responsibility (type 2). Interestingly, IMF programs do not have a measurable effect on fiscal adjustment, which is 
consistent with the findings of Bulir and Moon (2003).  For advanced countries, fiscal responsibility (type 2) is 
associated with flexible exchange rates, high growth, and low inflation.  
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types of unorthodox policies—including ones that could run contrary to the law—that are 
sometimes required in dire fiscal situations. For i nstance, in accomplishing large and 
sustained fiscal adjustments, governments could be obliged to break contracts (e.g., with 
public servants and suppliers), impose legal restrictions (capital barriers, deposit freezes, 
etc.), and perhaps even violate property rights (forced nationalization, debt defaults). 
Weaker institutional structures, particularly those that can be easily swayed by the 
executive, would facilitate a government’s task in these extreme situations.  
This interpretation gains further support when the countries making up type 1 
instances are considered (Iran, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nicaragua, Egypt, Pakistan, Bulgaria, 
Zimbabwe, Jordan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Morocco;
37 see Table 2). 
Most of these countries have autocratic governments, or at least had them during their 
periods of fiscal adjustment. The degree of executive leeway in these regimes is probably 
quite high, which could explain the low rule-of-law score and would be consistent with a 
certain ability and willingness of these governments to “bend the rules” when required. 
Moreover, there does not appear to be an obvious common trend among these countries 
(such as geographic proximity, conflicts, or oil-exporter status) that would help explain 
their shared ability to make large fiscal efforts.  No particular country dominates the 
sample, and the fiscal efforts occur over a wide range of time periods, suggesting that 
there was not some single global event that favoured the adjustments.
38  
Taken as a whole,  the  results  for  the quality of economic institutions  in 
developing countries  are consistent with the following  explanation:  high institutional 
quality usually i mposes greater rigour on fiscal policy,  but  inflexible  institutional 
frameworks can constrain government action in times of fiscal distress, impeding fiscal  
 
                                                 
37 The countries are listed in descending order of importance in the sample: from eight years in Iran to three years in 
Morocco. 
38 It is interesting to note, however, that, aside from Nicaragua, there are no type 1 Latin American countries in the 
sample ( although they are well represented in terms of failed fiscal efforts).  This suggests that Latin American 
governments have particular difficulty in making large and sustained fiscal efforts, a notion well backed by the debt 
crisis literature.    
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adjustment.
39 If this view is correct, then it follows that institutional structures in many 
fiscally vulnerable developing countries may be too rigid.
40 This interpretation is broadly 
in line with Abiad and Baig (2005), who find that high executive constraints (a measure 
of checks and balances) weaken fiscal efforts by inducing decision-making paralysis.  
Another robust result for developing countries is that high levels of subsidies and 
transfers, a proxy for rent-seeking vested interests, significantly diminish the probability 
of successfully carrying out a large fiscal adjustment.
41 This result is consistent with the 
literature  and confirms that  cuts in these expenditures are among the most effective 
policy measures for successful consolidation. Interestingly, there does not appear to be a 
significant difference between the level of  subsidies  and  transfers found in types 0  
(failure) and 2 (no need). One explanation may be that the variable is only a good proxy 
for vested interests among countries with relatively low levels of governance, typified by 
governments  that are often in situations of fiscal need.  For countries with better 
governance standards, such as advanced nations and developing countries that usually run 
sound fiscal policies (type 2),  subsidies  and  transfers  may not present a significant 
obstacle to adjustment.  
                                                 
39 A practical example of this interpretation can be observed by comparing the post-crisis fiscal adjustments in 
Argentina (2000–03) and Russia (1998). Throughout the 1990s, Argentina had a higher rule of law score than Russia, 
reflecting, among other things, an independent judiciary, strong property rights, a developed federal system, a friendly  
foreign direct investment policy, sound banking regulations, and political commitment to a currency board. In Russia, 
market institutions were not well entrenched and much discretionary authority remained in the hands of the executive. 
During and after its crisis, the Argentine government encountered a multitude of institutional and political obstacles 
that prevented it from restoring macro-stability and significantly increasing public savings. For example, the steps of 
dropping the currency board, freezing dollar deposits, converting them to pesos, amending utilities contracts, reaching a 
revenue-sharing deal with the provinces, and ultimately defaulting on sovereign debt all encountered significant legal, 
constitutional, and political challenges that considerably delayed the adjustment process. In Russia, where there was no 
effective opposition to the central authority and few institutional limits, the government was able to take drastic action 
quickly. Almost at the stroke of a pen, public debt was massively restructured, principal payments on foreign debt were 
frozen, and capital controls were put into place, all of which contributed to Russia’s relatively rapid rebound after the 
devaluation. Of course, the subsequent improvement in the Russian fiscal situation had much to do with the price of oil, 
but sweeping tax reforms also contributed.  
40 This rigidity could occur for several reasons. Perhaps the most intriguing is that the greater vulnerability of certain 
developing economies to fiscal shocks may lead to excessively unyielding institutional frameworks designed to 
reinforce the intertemporal credibility of public policies by strictly constraining the government’s behaviour. Although 
these rigid rules may well help the countries to avoid getting into fiscal difficulties, when a large shock does occur the 
constraints become a liability. Alternatively, this rigidity may simply be the result of slowly evolving institutions that 
have failed to keep pace with economic and financial developments.  
41 The impact of subsidies and transfers is not significantly different from zero when the source of fiscal need is 
uniquely a financial crisis.   
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The margin of majority is the only political variable found to have a significant 
effect on the fiscal status of developing countries. This is consistent with earlier work 
indicating that political stability and  effective government control over the  budgetary 
process increase the chances of a successful fiscal effort. However, Table 8 shows that 
this result is not robust to certain changes in the definition of fiscal adjustment; in 
particular, the coefficient is not significant for very large fiscal efforts (5 per cent of 
GDP). Nevertheless, it is always positive and remains significant during crisis-provoked 
needs. 
The results for inequality are the only ones seemingly at odds with mainstream 
theory. In fact, high inequality, as measured by Gini indexes, is found to significantly 
increase the probability  of being a type 2, meaning it decreases the  likelihood  of a  
country getting into a situation of fiscal need, the opposite of Sach’s (1989) prediction. 
This  result could  potentially  be attributable to the heavy fiscal burden of large 
redistributive programs.  Indeed,  a government that manages to flatten income 
distributions may be saddled with large consumption expenditures and transfer 
obligations, making it  more prone to get into fiscal difficulty.  Countries with lower 
redistributional burdens (and consequently greater inequality) may find they have more 
fiscal breathing room.  
4.3  Advanced countries 
The most robust finding  for advanced countries (Tables 7 and 9)  is that democratic 
accountability has a positive influence on the probability of avoiding a situation of 
serious fiscal need.  Moreover,  it would seem that election years also enhance the 
likelihood of a type 2 (no fiscal need) outcome. Both these results suggest that stronger 
democratic systems encourage sound fiscal policies, which is consistent with recent 
research suggesting that democracy may be a deep determinant of overall 
macroeconomic stability (Satyanath and Subramanian 2004).  As expected in the 
literature, the robustness tests also reveal that large fiscal efforts (a 5 per cent primary 
surplus adjustment)  tend not to occur during election years. N either of the election 
coefficients, however, is robust to changes in the definition of fiscal needs or the level of 
adjustment.  
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Although further research is required before drawing any firm conclusions, as a 
whole these results are compatible with the notion that there is a greater political appetite 
for fiscal rigour in advanced countries than in developing ones. Indeed, this would be 
congruent with the findings of Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1998), who show that fiscal 
consolidation does not negatively influence electoral outcomes in  industrialized 
economies.
42 The stark differentiation between the two country groups with respect to the 
role of democracy in fiscal adjustment is likely  attributable to a myriad of historical, 
social, economic, and political factors that are beyond the limited empirical scope of this 
paper.
43  
It is interesting to note that, as opposed to the results for developing countries, 
advanced nations making fiscal adjustments are not characterized by relatively  weak 
economic institutions  (i.e., a low  rule-of-law score). Indeed, a   comparison of simple 
averages (Table 4) shows that there is little difference in the levels of institutional quality 
between countries that fail to make an adjustment and those that succeed in doing so. 
However, countries avoiding a situation of fiscal distress display a notably higher mean 
rule-of-law score, a result similar to that found for developing countries. Although this 
last relationship is not significant in the final econometric specification for the advanced 
group,  it is significant at the 20 per cent level when the rule of law is considered 
individually (column 2 of Table 7). 
This  result indicates that the differences between advanced and developing 
countries  may not be  as stark as the final specifications suggest.  The most salient 
commonality revealed in  the descriptive statistics (Tables 3 and 4) concerns the 
characteristics of countries running sound fiscal policies (type 2). For both advanced and 
developing countries, type 2 instances have higher  mean scores for the  rule of law, 
                                                 
42 It would seem that no studies have yet addressed this issue for developing countries. The literature does not, 
however, indicate that fiscal consolidations are less contractionary in advanced countries than they are in developing 
ones. In fact, Purfield (2003) and Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano (2000) actually find that instances of expansionary 
fiscal consolidations are more common in developing countries. 
43 Some possible explanations (and areas for future research) include the fact that advanced countries have higher levels 
of education (increasing public awareness of the importance of government finances) and material well-being (allowing 
efficiency arguments to trump distributional conflicts for the average voter), as well as a relatively more diversified 
media (encouraging broader information dissemination and a franker discussion of public policies). Another tentative 
explanation may be that the formal political institutions of advanced countries adequately represent and integrate 
socioeconomic conflicts, such that the best democracies may be capable of resolving these tensions in a manner that 
does not weigh too heavily on public finances. In developing countries, however, where political systems are relatively 
immature, socioeconomic conflicts may be left to fester outside of the formal political sphere.  
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democratic accountability, and government stability than types 0 or 1. Indeed, each of 
these variables generates a positive coefficient when regressed alone with the control 
variables (columns 2 to 11 in Tables 6 and 7). 
Some of the differences between the coefficients of the two country groups could 
stem from technical factors. Although the actual correlations between the explanatory 
variables are not particularly high, multicollinearity could still be affecting the results to a 
limited extent, particularly in advanced countries. There is also the simple fact that there 
is less variance between the political economy scores of advanced countries than is the 
case for developing ones. It may be that changes in the ICRG variables differ in their 
applicability to the two country groups; for instance, small variations in the scores of 
advanced countries may actually  indicate significant political economy developments, 
events that  would warrant a greater  absolute  change  in  the indexes of  developing 
countries.  
The suggested dependence of good fiscal policy on democracy, sound economic 
institutions, and political stability—in advanced and developing countries alike—is an 
important thesis that merits further research. More detailed investigations may reveal 
stronger empirical linkages.  
5.  Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the existing literature by expanding the range of situations in 
which the role  of  political economy  factors in  fiscal adjustment can be examined.  It 
considers the effect of these variables not only during periods of fiscal adjustment, but 
also during periods when governments should be making fiscal efforts and fail to do so, 
as well  as periods when no adjustment is required. The new methodology  is used to 
address issues that have not received much attention in the literature, including the role of 
political and institutional  factors in  fostering sound  fiscal  policies, and whether those 
factors differ for countries that are actually in the process of fiscal consolidation.  
Although the paper’s results and interpretations are preliminary, they do suggest 
some general conclusions. The most obvious is that fiscal programming in developing 
countries should take into consideration political economy factors. Since the results show  
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that political economy forces have a significant impact on fiscal adjustment, it follows 
that programs failing to adequately account for political and institutional realities may run 
a higher risk of failure; at the very least, they will  misrepresent the constraints facing 
policy-makers. Detailed political economy analyses may be of particular relevance for 
IMF programming, helping to produce feasible fiscal plans and borrowing strategies that 
better  suit the needs and capabilities of client  countries.
44 They c ould also assist in 
formulating and implementing coherent structural reform programs. 
The findings also lend support to the notion that sound institutions are key to 
long-run economic welfare and efficiency. A growing literature is providing evidence 
that respect for the rule of law and democratic accountability are important determinants 
of  growth and macroeconomic stability; this paper’s  results  suggest that these same 
institutional factors also enhance the likelihood of maintaining sound fiscal policies. This 
comforting c onclusion endorses the priority accorded to institutional reform in recent 
development policy. 
The results highlight the importance of fiscal flexibility in developing countries. 
Strong legislative majorities and l ower subsidies  and transfers—two factors found to 
increase the odds of  successfully making  a fiscal effort—are  clear  indicators of a 
government’s margin of manoeuvre. This is consistent with recent reviews of the debt 
crisis literature claiming that only those governments that were relatively unhampered by 
political economy constraints managed to make the fiscal adjustments required to avoid 
defaulting in the 1980s (Lavigne 2006).  
The critical role of fiscal flexibility is further underscored by this paper’s proposal 
that weaker institutions may  allow certain governments to take the drastic action 
sometimes  required to adjust in periods of need ( albeit at the cost of increasing the 
probability of a relapse into financial distress later on). If this interpretation is valid, it 
follows that a reduction in institutional rigidity may be preferable in fiscally vulnerable 
countries, to ensure that their governments can implement essential fiscal measures in 
times of crisis without undermining the integrity of their legal and democratic 
frameworks. It is important to note that this is by no means an endorsement of weak 
                                                 
44 In certain cases, for instance, it should be recognized that a cessation of IMF lending to a government lacking the 
political or institutional capacity for sustained fiscal reform may be in the long-term interest of the country.   
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institutions; on the contrary, the results clearly  indicate that sound fiscal policies  are 
encouraged by strong institutions. Institutions, however, may need to be strengthened by 
increasing their flexibility, in such a manner that they can remain anchors of stability in 
times of fiscal distress, but without being an insurmountable obstacle to adjustment.  
The types of reforms suggested by this interpretation are not simple, since there is 
likely  a trade-off between institutional flexibility and  predictability at some point. 
Nevertheless,  lower predictability  need not necessarily  imply  arbitrariness  or  reduced 
credibility.  One way of proceeding could be to implement institutional reforms that 
clarify the “rules of the game” under a variety of situations, including fiscal distress. For 
instance, this could involve developing better public bankruptcy laws, introducing 
contingency clauses in government contracts and debt instruments (making them easier to 
modify under certain circumstances), or clearly defining authorities’ emergency powers 
in a financial crisis. Of course, these are mere  suggestions, since the determinants of 
institutional quality and the definition of flexibility will necessarily be country-specific. 
Nevertheless, reforms of this nature, aiming to clarify contingent policies and increase 
institutional transparency, would reduce both investor uncertainty in times of crisis and 
the risk of encountering institutional resistance to needed fiscal adjustment. 
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Table 2: Dependent Variable (fiscal status)
a 
Country   Failed fiscal effort 
 (0) 
Successful fiscal effort 
 (1) 
No fiscal need 
(2) 
United States      1987-2000 
United Kingdom  1987; 1992-93    1988-91; 1994-99 
Austria  1987-96    1997-99 
Belgium  1995-97  1987-94  1998 
Denmark      1987-2000 
France  1994-97    1987-93 
Germany      1994-98 
Italy  1994-98  1987-93   
Netherlands  1987-90    1991-97 
Norway      1987-99 
Sweden  1987-1990  1991-96  1997-99 
Switzerland      1991-00 
Canada  1987-92  1993-96  1997-00 
Finland  1991-98    1987-90 
Greece  1987-98    1990-91;1995-98 
Iceland  1987-89;1992-94    1990-91; 1995-98 
Ireland    1987-92  1993-97 
Portugal  1987-97    1998 
Spain  1987-97     
Australia      1987-98 
New Zealand    1987-89  1990-99 
Malta  1992-98    1989-91 
Luxemburg      1988-99 
Israel  1987-90  1991-96  1997-99 
Turkey  1991-01    1987-90 
Argentina  1987-89    1990-00 
Chile      1987-00 
Colombia      1987-99 
Costa Rica  1987-92;1994-98    1993;1999-00 
Mexico  1987-92    1993-00 
Panama  1987-88    1989-00 
Nicaragua  1995-99  1988-94  2000 
Paraguay      1987-00 
Peru  1987-93    1994-00 
Venezuela  1998-99    1987-97; 2000 
Bahrain      1987-00 
Cyprus  1988-98     
Iran    1987-94  1995-00 
Jordan  1992-93  1987-91  1994-00 
Oman  1991-00     
Egypt    1987-93  1994-97 
Sri Lanka  1991-00  1987-90   
India  1987-00     
Indonesia      1987-97 
South Korea      1988-97 
Malaysia  1992  1987-91  1993-97 
Pakistan  1989-94  1995-2000   
Philippines  1997-00  1987-89  1990-96 
Thailand      1987-2000 
New Guinea Papua      1987-99 
Bulgaria  1997-98  1991-96  1999-00 
Hungary  1989-00    1987-88 
Sierra Leone  1988-99     
Morocco  1990-95  1987-89  1997-99 
Tunisia  1987-99     
South Africa   1987-98    1999-00 
Botswana      1987-96 
Ethiopia  1988-90; 1998-99  1991-97   
Kenya  1992-96  1987-91  1997-98 
Zimbabwe  1988; 1996-97  1987; 1989-95   
Madagascar  1991-97    1998-00 
Total: 727 data points  273  114  340 
Advanced: 276 data points  97  40  139 
Developing: 451 data points  176  74  201 
Note: This is the exact dataset that is used in the final specifications (column 13 of Table 6 and column 12 of Table 7). 
It is much reduced from its potential size due to limitations of explanatory variable data.  
a In this particular case, the adjustment required to qualify as a fiscal effort is 2.5% of GDP. All three types of triggers 
of fiscal need (i.e., cumulative deficit of 20% of GDP, high debt levels, and financial crises) are activated. The deficit 
threshold is set at 2%, which explains why some well-known crises of the 1990s (Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, 
etc.) do not show up as instances of fiscal need. 
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Table 3: Basic Political Economy Statistics for Developing Countries 
Fiscal status  Political economy  
variable  0  1  2 
Rule of law  6.1 (1.7)
 1  4.9 (1.5)  6.5 (1.6) 
Democratic accountability  3.5 (1.2)  3.2 (0.9)  3.4 (1.2) 
Plurality  0.54 (0.5)  0.75 (0.4)  0.58 (0.5) 
Government stability  6.3 (1.9)  5.7 (1.7)  6.7 (1.7) 
Majority government  0.68 (0.20)  0.81 (0.20)  0.63 (0.18) 
Executive elections  0.11 (0.32)  0.12 (0.32)  0.12 (0.33) 
Subsidies and transfers  25.6 (15.2)  19.2 (11.3)  26.9 (16.2) 
Inequality  38.5 (17.5)  44.3 (10.7)  42.9 (14.4) 
Population over 65  5.2 (3.3)  4.2 (3.1)  4.5 (2.3) 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization  0.47 (0.30)  0.51 (0.25)  0.52 (0.25) 
Notes: As in Table 2, the adjustment required to qualify as a fiscal effort is 2.5% of GDP. All three types of triggers of 
fiscal need (cumulative deficit of 20% of GDP, debt thresholds, and financial crises) are activated. 




Table 4: Basic Political Economy Statistics for Advanced Countries 
Fiscal status  Political economy  
variable  0  1  2 
Rule of law  8.6 (1.5)
 1  8.8 (1.7)  9.4 (1.1) 
Democratic accountability  5.2 (0.9)  5.4 (0.8)  5.8 (0.4) 
Plurality  0.41 (0.50)  0.20 (0.39)  0.52 (0.50) 
Government stability  7.3 (1.5)  7.4 (1.6)  7.5 (1.5) 
Majority government  0.58 (0.11)  0.55 (0.06)  0.54 (0.11) 
Executive elections  0.02 (0.14)  0.03 (0.16)  0.07 (0.26) 
Subsidies and transfers  49.5 (16.2)  54.8 (11.4)  57.0 (12.2) 
Inequality  28.5 (12.2)  31.2 (5.1)  32.3 (9.4) 
Population over 65  13.9 (2.2)  13.4 (2.8)  13.6 (1.9) 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization  0.22 (0.21)  0.34 (0.23)  0.32 (0.21) 
Notes: As in Table 2, the adjustment required to qualify as a fiscal effort is 2.5% of GDP. All three types of triggers of 
fiscal need (cumulative deficit of 20% of GDP, debt thresholds, and financial crises) are activated. 






  37 
Table 5: Data Description 
POLITICAL FACTORS 
Government stability – (score of 1-12) This is an ICRG (PRS Group 2002) assessment of both the government’s ability 
to carry out its declared program(s) and its ability to stay in office. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three 
subcomponents: government unity, legislative strength, and popular support. A score of 4 points means very low risk and 
a score of 0 points means very high risk. 
Majority government – this measures the percentage of seats in the legislative body controlled by the governing 
coalition. The series was taken from the World Bank (2005). 
Executive elections – this binary variable (1/0) indicates whether an executive election is taking place in a given year. 
The series was taken from the World Bank (2005). 
Plurality – this binary variable (1/0) indicates whether legislators are elected using a winner-take-all / first-past-the-post 
rule. The series was taken from the World Bank (2005). 
SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS 
Gini coefficient – standard measure of income inequality. The annual series is a collection of local surveys that cover 
national income. Constructed from the United Nations University (2005). 
Subsidies and transfers (% of government expenditures) – This series was collected from the World Bank (2002). 
Population over 65 (% population) – This series was collected from the World Bank (2002). 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (in 1985) – A Herfindahl index capturing the probability that two individuals randomly 
picked from the population will belong to different groups. It reaches a theoretical maximum of 1 when every individual 
belongs to a different group. The index is taken from Roeder.  
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
Democratic accountability – (score of 1-12) This is an ICRG (PRS Group 2002) measure of how responsive a 
government is to its people. High values are attributed to strong democracies, and very low scores to autocracies. This 
measure factors in a variety of institutional factors, such as the quality of elections, freedom of political debate, the 
system of checks and balances, and the protection of personal liberties.  
Rule of law – (score 1-12) This variable is constructed taking the weighted average of the law and order and the 
investment profile indexes from the ICRG (PRS Group 2002). This composite index is designed to represent the 
application of the law in support of economic activity and the proper functioning of markets. A higher score would 
indicate, for instance, a better respect for property rights and contracts.  
a. Law and order – Law and order are assessed separately, with each subcomponent comprising zero to three points. The 
law subcomponent is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the order subcomponent is 
an assessment of popular observance of the law. Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating (3) in terms of its judicial 
system, but a low rating (1) if it suffers from a very high crime rate, or if the law is routinely ignored without effective 
sanction (for example, widespread illegal strikes).  
b. Investment profile – (score 1-12) This measure of investor protection is an assessment of factors affecting diverse risks 
to foreign investment: contract viability/expropriation, profit repatriation, and payment delays. The treatment of foreign 
investors is viewed as an indicator of the overall integrity of the legal system. 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Trade/GDP – Exports + imports /GDP. These data are taken from Felushko and Santor (2005). 
Exchange rate regime – this index attributes values to exchange rate regimes, ordering them according to their degree of 
flexibility. The index ranges from 0 for free-floating regimes to 10 for fully dollarized regimes. It was calculated using 
the exchange rate classification in Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). 
Trend revenues – the cyclically adjusted (filtered) value of revenues/GDP. This series was constructed using raw 
revenue data from the World Bank (2002). 
Real GDP growth and world growth – These data are taken from Felushko and Santor (2005) and the Bank of Canada.  
CPI inflation – inflation is often a good indicator of a country’s overall macroeconomic stability, which will have some 
bearing on fiscal policy. This series was collected from the World Bank (2002). 
IMF program – This binary variable indicates whether a country has an ongoing IMF program. IMF programs may have 
some beneficial impact on attempts to make fiscal efforts. These data are calculated from data used in Felushko and 
Santor (2005). 
Least-Developed Countries dummy – These data are calculated from data used in Felushko and Santor (2005). 
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Table 6: Political Economy Determinants of Fiscal Status for Developing Countries 
TYPE 1 [ Pr(Y=1) / Pr(Y=0) ] The dependent variable is fiscal status = (0, 1, or 2). 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
-0.25  -0.15                    -0.18  -0.18  Rule of law 
(-3.40)**  (-2.84)***                    (-2.32)**  (-3.04)*** 
0.08    -0.06                  0.03    Democratic 
accountability 
(0.86)    (-1.45)                  (0.38)   
0.03      0.14                0.06    Plurality 
(0.20)      (1.24)                (0.33)   
0.00        -0.03              0.01    Government 
stability 
(0.11)        (-1.33)              (0.09)   
0.06          0.01                Elections 
(0.38)          (-0.13)               
1.32            0.87          0.84  0.95  Margin of 
majority 
(2.49)**            (3.05)***          (1.85)  (2.21)** 
0.00              0.00        -0.01  -0.00  Inequality 
(0.44)              (0.36)        (-1.30)  (-0.43) 
-0.04                -0.01      -0.02  -0.02  Subsidies and 
transfers 
(-2.29)**                (-2.94)***      (-2.34)**  (-2.27)** 
-0.19                  0.02        Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization 
(-0.42)                  (0.07)       
0.08                    -0.03      Population 
over 65  (1.88)*                    (-0.93)     
TYPE 2 [ Pr(Y=2) / Pr(Y=0) ] 
0.09  0.08                    0.09  0.08  Rule of law 
(2.34)**  (2.09)**                    (1.93)*  (2.25)** 
-0.10    0.01                  -0.06    Democratic 
accountability 
(-1.72)    (0.17)                  (-0.98)   
-0.01      -0.00                0.00    Plurality 
(-0.07)      (0.02)                (0.02)   
0.00        0.04              0.01    Government 
stability 
(0.06)        (1.53)              (0.26)   
0.02          0.04                Elections 
(0.28)          (0.52)               
-0.32            -0.41          -0.24  -0.19  Margin of 
majority 
(-1.06)            (-1.50)          (-0.77)  (-0.60) 
0.01              0.01        0.01  0.02  Inequality 
(1.08)              (1.73)*        (2.67)***  (2.98)*** 
0.01                0.01      0.00  0.00  Subsidies and 
transfers  (1.18)                (1.65)*      (0.76)  (0.75) 
0.23                  0.19        Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization  (0.68)                  (0.63)       
-0.04                    -0.01      Population 
over 65  (-1.26)                    (-0.36)     
Observations  418  504  504  431  504  487  451  504  504  489  504  429  451 
Pseudo-R
2  0.29  0.14  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.08  0.12  0.10  0.12  0.09  0.09  0.25  0.25 
Notes: Coefficients are in terms of marginal effects (dY/dX) or a discrete change for a dummy variable. The Z-statistics are shown in parentheses (***1%, 
**5%, *10%). All regressions include a constant and the control variables noted in section 3 (Tables 5 and 10). Standard errors are robust, using country 
clusters. In columns 2 to 13, bold results indicate significance at the 20% level. 
The threshold for a fiscal effort is a monotonic increase in the cyclically adjusted primary balance of at least 2.5% of GDP over a period of six years. All 
three types of need triggers are activated: a five-year cumulative deficit of 20% of GDP, high debt levels (50% of GDP), and financial crises. 
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Table 7: Political Economy Determinants of Fiscal Status for Advanced Countries 
TYPE 1 [ Pr(Y=1) / Pr(Y=0) ] The dependent variable is fiscal status = (0, 1, or 2). 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
0.04  -0.01                  0.01    Rule of law 
(0.42)  (-0.25)                  (0.36)   
-0.24    -0.06                -0.08  -0.06  Democratic 
accountability 
(-1.49)    (-0.82)                (-0.84)  (-0.81) 
-0.03      -0.02                  Government 
stability 
(-0.38)      (-0.52)                 
-0.08        -0.05            -0.06  -0.05  Elections 
(-0.66)        (-0.60)            (-0.65)  (-0.51) 
-0.79          -0.22              Margin of majority 
(-1.33)          (-0.46)             
0.01            0.01            Inequality 
(1.19)            (1.03)           
0.00              0.00          Subsidies and 
transfers 
(0.44)              (0.83)         
0.63                0.36        Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization 
(1.58)                (1.22)       
-0.00                  0.00      Population over 
65 
(-0.02)                  (0.09)     
TYPE 2 [ Pr(Y=2) / Pr(Y=0) ] 
0.01  0.08                  -0.03    Rule of law 
(0.13)  (1.59)                  (-0.41)   
0.32    0.29                0.32  0.30  Democratic 
accountability 
(3.35)***    (2.97)***                (3.37)***  (2.99)*** 
-0.01      0.03                  Government 
stability 
(-0.16)      (0.83)                 
0.14        0.21            0.19  0.18  Elections 
(1.75)*        (2.08)**            (1.87)*  (1.87)* 
-0.42          -0.70              Margin of majority 
(-0.79)          (-1.07)             
0.00            0.01            Inequality 
(0.48)            (0.71)           
-0.00              0.00          Subsidies and 
transfers 
(-0.68)              (0.49)         
-0.35                -0.05        Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization 
(-1.14)                (-0.13)       
-0.02                  -0.03      Population over 
65 
(-0.56)                  (-0.76)     
Observations  273  280  280  280  276  276  280  277  280  280  276  276 
Pseudo-R
2  0.27  0.15  0.20  0.14  0.14  0.15  0.17  0.15  0.15  0.14  0.20  0.20 
Notes: Coefficients are in terms of marginal effects (dY/dX) or a discrete change for a dummy variable. The Z-statistics are shown in parentheses (***1%, 
**5%, *10%). All regressions include a constant and the control variables shown in Table 10. Standard errors are robust, using country clusters. In 
columns 2 to 12, bold results indicate significance at the 20% level. 
The threshold for a fiscal effort is a monotonic increase in the cyclically adjusted primary balance of at least 2.5% of GDP over a period of six years. All 
three types of need triggers are activated: a five-year cumulative deficit of 20% of GDP, high debt levels (50% of GDP), and financial crises. The variable 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10: Control Variables 
  Advanced countries  Developing countries 
TYPE 1  1  2  3  4 
0.16  0.10  -0.13  -0.02 
 
Openness 
(0.86)  (0.53)  (-0.48)  (-0.04) 




(-0.70)  (-0.63)  (-0.60)  (-2.41)** 




(-0.38)  (-0.28)  (0.07)  (-0.17) 




(-0.80)  (-0.87)  (-0.29)  (1.53) 
1.93  1.28  0.01  0.00 
 
Inflation 
(1.43)  (1.06)  (1.78)*  (0.62) 




(0.06)  (0.03)  (1.24)  (3.21) 




countries      (1.74)*  (0.56) 
    0.12  0.09 
 
IMF program 
    (1.63)*  (0.56) 
TYPE 2  1  2  3  4 
-0.17  -0.05  0.16  0.15 
 
Openness 
(0.91)  (-0.34)  (0.85)  (0.65) 




(-1.58)  (-1.53)  (0.64)  (1.13) 




(1.22)  (1.66)*  (2.71)*  (2.77)*** 




(-1.05)  (-1.68)*  (1.60)  (-0.02) 
-6.07  -3.66  -0.01  -0.01 
 
Inflation 
(-2.67)***  (-2.21)**  (-1.08)  (-0.78) 




(0.09)  (0.17)  (-1.23)  (-1.37) 




countries      (-1.20)  (-1.04) 
    -0.02  0.03 
 
IMF program 
    (-0.32)  (0.39) 
Observations 
  276  276  451  451 
Pseudo–R
2  0.13  0.20  0.07  0.25 
Notes: The dependent variable is fiscal status = (0, 1, 2). Coefficients are in terms of marginal effects (dY/dX) or a 
discrete change for a dummy variable. The Z-statistics are shown in parentheses (***1%, **5%, *10%). Standard 
errors are robust, using country clusters. Columns 2 and 4 are part of the last columns of Tables 6 and 7. 
The following notes refer to their respective column numbers: 
1. Control variables alone, same need and effort parameters as Table 7. 
2. Control variables of column 12 from Table 7. 
3. Control variables alone, same need and effort parameters as Table 6. 
4. Control variables of column 13 from Table 6. Bank of Canada Working Papers
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